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Does a tenant’s commercial vulnerability constitute a special 
disadvantage? 
 
 
The Full Federal Court has once again been called upon to explore the limits of 
s51AA of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) in the context of a retail tenancy 
between commercially experienced parties.  The decision is Australian Competition 
and Consumer Commission v Samton Holdings Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 62. 
 
Facts 
 
A company controlled by a Mr and Mrs Ranaldi acquired a lunch bar business.  In 
order to fund the acquisition of the business Mr and Mrs Ranaldi and their company 
mortgaged themselves “to the hilt”.  The business was to be the Ranaldis’ sole source 
of income and accordingly the hub of their financial security. 
 
The acquisition of the business included an assignment of the existing lease for the 
business premises.  The initial term of the lease was to expire on 2 June 1997 but 
there was an option to renew for a further term of seven (7) years.  Settlement of the 
purchase of the business took place on 26 February 1997.  The lease required the 
option to renew to be exercised by not later than 2 March 1997.  Mr Ranaldi 
purported to exercise the option on or about 18 March 1997. 
 
As the option was exercised out of time the company was left with the prospect of a 
substantial loss having acquired the business but having no on-going tenancy.  It 
would have been abundantly clear to the landlords that the company would be 
wishing to exercise the option.  Initially the landlords were not prepared to extend the 
time for the exercise of the option and were intending to take over the premises and 
run the business themselves.  Ultimately, the landlords required the company to pay 
the sum of $70,000 to gain an on-going tenancy.  $70,000.00 was a considerable sum 
of money given the financial position of the company and the Ranaldis (as known to 
the landlords). 
 
After receiving legal advice that the exercise of the option was invalid, the company 
considered that it had no real choice but to pay the $70,000.  If the payment was not 
made, Mr and Mrs Ranaldi stood to lose their home and at least $145,000.00.  The 
result, as noted by the trial judge, Justice Carr, was that a $70,000.00 mistake was 
made rather than a $145,000.00 mistake. 
 
To facilitate the payment of the $70,000.00, the landlords granted a lease to a 
company they controlled, Samton Holdings Pty Ltd, which then assigned the lease to 
the company.  This mechanism was employed so the transaction did not involve the 
payment of “key” money in contravention of the Commercial Tenancy (Retail Shops) 
Agreements Act 1985 (WA). 
 
The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (“ACCC”) alleged that the 
landlords and their company had engaged in conduct proscribed by s51AA (1) of the 
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) namely: 
 
“A corporation must not, in trade or commerce, engage in conduct that is 
unconscionable within the meaning of the unwritten law, from time to time, of the 
States and Territories.” 
 
At first instance, Justice Carr noted that the landlords had adopted “an avaricious, 
opportunistic approach and struck a very hard bargain”.  Despite holding that the 
company was at a “special disadvantage” that was known of, or ought to be known of, 
by the respondents, Justice Carr opined that the impugned conduct “fell short but not 
far short of being unconscionable”.  The matter came before Gray, French and Stone 
JJ following an appeal by the ACCC. 
 
Decision of the Full Federal Court 
 
In a unanimous judgment the Full Federal Court held that unconscionable conduct, in 
the context of s51AA of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), is conduct that supports 
the grant of relief on the principles set out in specific equitable doctrines.  On this 
basis relief may be granted in five categories of cases: 
 
(i) to set aside a contract or disposition that results from the knowing exploitation 
of a party’s special disadvantage whether that special disadvantage be constitutional 
(for example, deriving from age, illness, poverty or the like) or situational 
 
(ii) to set aside as against third parties those transactions falling within the well-
known principles affirmed in Garcia v National Australia Bank Ltd (1988) 194 CLR 
395 
 
(iii) to prevent the exercise of a legal right on the basis of equitable estoppel 
 
(iv) to provide relief against forfeiture and penalties 
 
(v) to rescind contracts entered into under the influence of a unilateral mistake 
 
In this instance, the relief sought was based on the first category being dependent on 
the situational special disadvantage of the company and the Ranaldis in their dealings 
with the landlords. 
 
Making the initial assumption that the company and the Ranaldis were in a position of 
special disadvantage (as held by Justice Carr) had the landlords acted in a manner that 
was unconscionable?  The inherent difficulty for the ACCC arose from their express 
concession that a mere refusal to permit an option to be exercised out of time, without 
more, could not the subject of a valid complaint at law or in equity. 
 
As noted by the court: 
 
“If it would not have been unconscionable for the respondents to refuse to grant a new 
lease and simply commence to operate a like business from the same premises 
themselves, how could it be unconscionable for them to agree to grant a new lease on 
conditions including payment of a lump sum for the assignment of lease rights from 
the first respondent, Samton Holdings?”1 
 
In essence the ability of the landlords to impose a premium on the acquisition of the 
on-going tenancy arose due the company having lost through its own fault the right to 
exercise the option.  This was not considered a sufficient basis for a claim of 
unconscionable conduct.  “To hold otherwise would be, in effect, to compel the other 
party to enter into a transaction which it could not be compelled by law to do and 
which, absent any estoppel, no doctrine of equity requires.”2 
 
As the landlords’ conduct could not be characterised as unconscionable conduct 
within the terms of s51AA of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ultimately the 
appeal of the ACCC was dismissed with costs.  However, before dismissing the 
appeal the Full Federal Court considered the question initially posed in this article. 
 
Was the tenant in a position of special disadvantage? 
 
The Full Federal Court did not want to be taken as agreeing with the finding of Justice 
Carr (and the initial assumption) that the tenant company was in a position of special 
disadvantage.  Whilst undoubtedly the tenant had very little bargaining power and 
was commercially vulnerable this disadvantage primarily arose from Mr Ranaldi’s 
oversight in neglecting to exercise the option in good time together with extensive 
borrowings.  At least in the case of an experienced business person, something more 
than commercial vulnerability was required to elevate disadvantage into “special 
disadvantage”. 
 
“The Ranaldis’ situation could not be characterised as one of special disadvantage 
only because the respondents failed to make an offer that they had no obligation to 
make.  It cannot be the case that any tenant whose careless failure to exercise an 
option to renew a lease results in economic disadvantage would be entitled to a 
renewal of the term.  A fortiori it cannot be the case that a tenant in that situation and 
absent other circumstances, is in a situation of special disadvantage.”3 
 
Supporting this conclusion that special disadvantage was absent was the decision of 
the Full Federal Court in CG Berbatis Holdings Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission [2001] FCA 757.  In that case a tenant’s detriment due to the 
imminent expiration of a lease was also not characterised as a special disadvantage. 
 
Propositions in relation to s51AA 
 
Following this decision, a number of propositions in relation to s51AA of the Trade 
Practices Act 1974 (Cth) can be stated with a degree of confidence: 
 
 The section is not limited in its scope to that discrete doctrine of 
unconscionable dealings as recognised by the High Court in Blomley v Ryan 
(1956) 99 CLR 362 and Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 
151 CLR 4474.  The section will extend to the five categories of cases 
identified in this article. 
 
 If relief is sought based on the first category identified, a “special 
disadvantage” may extend to “situational disadvantage”5 as well as 
“constitutional disadvantage”. 
 
 The reference in s51AA to the “unwritten law, from time to time, of the States 
and Territories” is a reference to the common law of Australia.  Although, as 
the section contemplates, the unwritten law may change from time to time the 
section itself does not extend the application of the principles of 
unconscionable conduct.6  The fact that the section may be invoked in 
commercial dealings does not mean that the section expands the unwritten 
law.7 
 
 The object of the section is to attract, to instances of unconscionable conduct 
to which it is applicable, the remedies available under the Trade Practices Act 
1974 (Cth) and to allow the ACCC to pursue these remedies. 
 
 The section does not apply to unconscionable conduct at large.  A remedy will 
not be available simply because a judge may consider conduct to be unfair.8 
 
Practice Pointers 
 
The decision provides the following guidance for practitioners: 
 
 In a leasing context, a landlord’s refusal to permit a tenant to exercise an 
option out of time is not objectionable either at law or in equity in the absence 
of some other conduct.  Equally a commercial landlord would not be obliged 
to offer a further lease term to an existing tenant who does not have the benefit 
of an option to renew. 
 
 Relief will not be granted simply because a party has acted unreasonably 
towards another in the particular circumstances.  The mere fact that a party 
acts in a way that fair-minded people may condemn is also not of itself 
indicative of unconscionable conduct.9 
 
 Commercial vulnerability (due largely, in this instance, to the tenant’s own 
neglect) will not be enough to constitute special disadvantage in the case of an 
experienced businessperson having access to independent legal advice. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The decision of the Full Federal Court is to be welcomed as providing further 
guidance concerning the scope of s51AA of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth).  
Despite suggestions to the contrary, the clear statutory wording is not be restricted by 
qualifications imposed by the Explanatory Memorandum or the Second Reading 
Speech.10 
 
The possibility of a “situational disadvantage” arising in a commercial context means 
that landlords (amongst others) will face the spectre of similar litigation in the future 
unless they are successfully able to walk the tightrope between what may be regarded 
as simply driving a hard bargain and unconscionable conduct.  The case further 
highlights the vigilance of the ACCC where unconscionable conduct is alleged.  In 
this regard it is noteworthy that the decision necessarily proceeded under the 
provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) then applicable.  As noted by 
Professor Fels, the subsequent introduction of s51AC (effective from 1 July 1998) 
“provides an improved level of legal protection for small businesses”.11 
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